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“FOLLOWING-TO-JOIN” THE FIFTH AND 
NINTH CIRCUITS: WHY THE SUPREME 
COURT IN SCIALABBA V. CUELLAR DE 
OSORIO ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE 
CHILD STATUS PROTECTION ACT 
Justin Youngs∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION
There are countless hoops to jump through for non-citizens 
wishing to become legal permanent residents (LPRs) in the United 
States. Besides figuring out how to obtain LPR status, non-citizens 
often wonder whether they can bring along those family members 
closest to them. A common scenario, addressed by this Comment, is 
one in which a non-citizen parent wishes to immigrate or reunify 
with his or her non-citizen child. Fortunately for non-citizens, federal 
laws governing immigration to the United States.1 provide a path to 
LPR status for both the non-citizen parent and their child.2 
However, this path becomes treacherous when a non-citizen 
parent’s child is no longer a child in the eyes of immigration law. 
Avenues that once seemed navigable turn into dead-ends, and 
non-citizen parents are left wondering how they will ever be able to 
reunite with their adult children. In 2002, Congress attempted to 
relieve this anxiety by passing the Child Status Protection Act 
(CSPA).3 Section 3 of the Act ideally provides an avenue for adult 
children to join their non-citizen parents: a process that allows them 
∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2016, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science,
University of California, Los Angeles. I would like to thank Professor Aimee Dudovitz for her 
invaluable feedback during the writing process, and Professor Kevin Lapp for piquing my interest 
in immigration law. Additionally, I would like to thank the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review for their incredible work on this Issue. 
1. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2012).
2. See id. § 1153.
3. Child Status Protection Act, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
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to change visa categories without having to wait in line.4 
Unfortunately, this alternate path does not come without obstacles, 
and the recent Supreme Court decision in Scialabba v. Cuellar de 
Osorio5 may have provided the largest obstacle yet. 
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court in Scialabba 
incorrectly interpreted Provision (h)(3) of Section 3 of the CSPA as 
ambiguous and therefore should not have deferred to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ (BIA’s) interpretation. Part II details the 
statutory framework surrounding Provision (h)(3). Part III discusses 
the facts of Scialabba. Part IV dissects the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court’s majority ruling. Part V analyzes the various approaches to 
interpreting Provision (h)(3) and the circuit court split that preceded 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Scialabba. Part VI first examines 
why the Supreme Court in Scialabba erred in its interpretation of 
Provision (h)(3). Second, Part VI explains why the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits’ approach to interpreting Provision (h)(3), and their actual 
interpretation of the provision, is correct. Lastly, Part VI addresses 
the principal concerns the Supreme Court has regarding the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits’ interpretation. This Comment concludes that the 
Supreme Court should have adopted the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ 
interpretation of the Provision (h)(3). 
II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
A non-citizen parent who wishes to obtain LPR status by either 
immigrating to the U.S. or switching from a temporary visa to LPR 
status has a limited number of options. To gain LPR status through 
one of the family preference visas (“F(#) visas”), a non-citizen must 
have a qualifying familial relationship with either a U.S. citizen or a 
current LPR.6 If such a qualifying relationship exists, the U.S. citizen 
or LPR, known as a sponsor, can petition for the non-citizen to 
obtain an immigrant visa, known as a visa petition.7 When a visa 
4. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h).
5. 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014).
6. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a). This section lists five family preference categories in order of
priority, which determines the number of visas each category receives annually. Family 
preference categories are as follows: [F1] unmarried adult (21 or over) sons and daughters of U.S. 
citizens; [F2A] spouses and unmarried minor (under 21) children of LPRs; [F2B] unmarried adult 
sons and daughters of LPRs; [F3] married sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; and [F4] brothers 
and sisters of U.S. citizens. Id. 
7. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2196.
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then becomes available for the non-citizen, known as the principal 
beneficiary, a visa subsequently becomes available for the principal 
beneficiary’s minor children, known as derivative beneficiaries.8 The 
principal beneficiary and any of their derivative beneficiaries must 
then separately file their own visa applications demonstrating their 
admissibility, meet with a consular officer, and pass inspection at the 
border before they can become LPRs.9 
Although the process above appears rather seamless, this is 
rarely the case. One major issue that plagues non-citizens is the wait 
time between the date their visa petition is approved and the date 
upon which a visa application becomes available for filing. Not only 
is the number of visas available for each family preference category 
capped annually,10 but the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 
also places a ceiling on the number of visas allotted to each 
country.11 These restrictions result in a queue that can last as long as 
twenty-three years for non-citizens from certain countries.12 
Furthermore, these wait times present a larger issue: they can cause 
derivative beneficiaries, who must be twenty-one years of age or 
younger at the time a visa application is submitted,13 to grow older 
than twenty-one (“aging out”) by the time an application even 
becomes available.14 
Fortunately, Congress addressed the issue of aged out 
beneficiaries in 2002 by adopting the CSPA.15 Section 3 of the CSPA 
applies to derivative beneficiaries of prospective LPRs.16 Provision 
(h) of Section 3 includes three provisions that work to avoid the
8. Id. at 2198.
9. Id. at 2198–99.
10. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(1)–(4).
11. Id. § 1152(a)(2) (“[T]he total number of immigrant visas made available to natives of
any single foreign state . . . in any fiscal year may not exceed 7 percent . . . of the total number of 
such visas made available under such subsections in that fiscal year.”). 
12. Visa Bulletin for October 2014, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS
(Sept. 8, 2014), http://travel.state.gov/content/visas/english/law-and-policy/bulletin/2015/visa 
-bulletin-for-october-2014.html (showing a twenty-three-year wait time for non-citizens from the
Philippines, as indicated by the current priority date being visa petitions filed in April 1991).
13. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (referring to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1), which defines “child” as “an
unmarried person under twenty-one years”); id. § 1153(h) (explaining that a derivative 
beneficiary’s age is determined “on the date on which an immigrant visa number becomes 
available for such alien”). 
14. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2199.
15. See Child Status Protection Act, 107 Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2199. 
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h).
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aging out problem.17 The first provision (“Provision (h)(1)”) 
provides a formula that allows an aged out beneficiary to subtract 
from his or her age the amount of time it took for a sponsor’s visa 
petition to be approved and the time it took for the actual submitted 
visa application to be approved.18 The second provision (“Provision 
(h)(2)”) explains that the Provision (h)(1) applies to any non-citizen 
seeking an F2A visa (spouses and unmarried children of LPRs) or a 
derivative beneficiary seeking any other family preference 
category.19 Although this formula undoubtedly helps to reduce an 
aged out beneficiary’s age, it does not relieve the most laboring part 
of the administrative process: the time spent waiting for a visa to 
become available.20 As a result, there are still derivative beneficiaries 
who remain aged out despite the first provision formula. 
The third provision of section 3 (“Provision (h)(3)”) of the 
CSPA attempts to rectify this problem through two distinct measures. 
Provision (h)(3) states that if a derivative beneficiary remains aged 
out despite the Provision (h)(1) formula, his or her visa petition 
should (1) automatically convert to an appropriate family preference 
category while (2) retaining the parent’s visa application priority 
date.21 Provision (h)(3) is the one at issue in Scialabba.22 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Scialabba began at the district court level as two separate suits.23 
In both cases, the district court granted summary judgment against 
the plaintiff, deferring to the BIA’s interpretation of Provision (h)(3) 
in Matter of Wang.24 The cases were consolidated on appeal where 
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.25 The Ninth 
Circuit then reversed the district court’s ruling when it granted 
rehearing en banc.26 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the language 
of the CSPA was unambiguous in providing “automatic conversion 
17. Id. §§ 1153(h)(1)–(3).
18. Id. § 1153(h)(1).
19. Id. §§ 1153(h)(1)–(2) (referencing subsections (a)(2)(a) and (d) of § 1153).
20. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2201.
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3).
22. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2201.
23. Id. at 2202.
24. Id. (discussing Matter of Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 29 (B.I.A. 2009)).
25. Id.
26. Id.
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and priority date retention to aged out derivative beneficiaries.”27 
The Supreme Court then granted writ of certiorari to resolve the 
circuit court split on the interpretation of Provision (h)(3).28 In 
holding that Provision (h)(3) does not apply to all aged out 
beneficiaries, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit judgment and 
remanded the case for further proceedings.29 
The respondents in Scialabba were three families with similar 
circumstances. A principal beneficiary was seeking either an F3 
(married sons or daughters of U.S. citizens) or F4 visa (brothers and 
sisters of U.S. citizens) wanting his or her son or daughter to gain 
legal status along with them.30 Each child of the principal beneficiary 
was under twenty-one at the time the sponsor’s visa petition was 
filed, qualifying them as derivative beneficiaries.31 However, by the 
time the actual visa applications became available, the derivative 
beneficiaries had aged out.32 The principal beneficiaries then 
immigrated to the United States without his or her son or daughter 
and filed subsequent F2B petitions (unmarried adult sons and 
daughters of LPRs) on their behalf.33 Instead of allowing these 
derivative beneficiaries to simply convert to the F2B category 
without waiting in line for a visa application to become available, 
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) refused 
to do so and applied current priority dates to the F2B petitions.34 In 
doing so, the USCIS ensured that the derivative beneficiaries would 
have to wait years to join their parents in the U.S.35 
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court’s decision in Scialabba to reverse the 
judgment of the Ninth Circuit turns on the majority’s interpretation 
of Provision (h)(3).36 The Court explained that if the Provision (h)(3) 
did “not speak clearly to the question at issue,” the Court was 
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2213.
30. Id.; de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1010 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom.
Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014). 
31. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2202.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1010.
36. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2202.
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required to defer to the BIA’s interpretation.37 Since the provision 
did not “speak unambiguously to the issue” because it had two 
divergent clauses, the Court concluded it was ambiguous.38 
The first clause of Provision (h)(3) states, “the age of an alien is 
determined under paragraph (1) to be 21 years of age or older for the 
purposes of subsections (a)(2)(A) and (d).”39 In referencing 
beneficiaries of an F2A visa (subsection (a)(2)(A)) and all other 
family preference visas (subsection (d)), the Court saw this clause as 
being satisfied by all aged out beneficiaries.40 The second clause 
states, “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the 
appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority 
date.”41 In contrast to the first clause, the Court viewed the second 
clause as providing a remedy that applies only to certain eligible 
derivative beneficiaries rather than to all of them.42 
The Court emphasized that because the second clause of 
Provision (h)(3) directs officials to automatically convert a derivative 
beneficiary’s visa petition from one family category to another, the 
petition should not be changed in any way, such as having a new 
sponsor.43 Thus, the second clause only applies to those derivative 
beneficiaries who can seamlessly move from one family category to 
another without having their petition altered.44 The Court therefore 
reasoned that since the first clause applies to all derivative 
beneficiaries, but the second clause does not, Provision (h)(3) as a 
whole is ambiguous.45 
After concluding that Provision (h)(3) is ambiguous, the Court 
then explained the BIA’s interpretation of the provision and its 
rationale for agreeing with the BIA’s interpretation. Specifically, the 
Court examined the BIA’s interpretation of the phrase “automatic 
conversion.”46 The BIA concluded in Matter of Wang that 
“automatic conversion” is available to non-citizens when their visa 
37. Id. at 2203 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
844 (1984)). 
38. Id.
39. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(h)(3) (2012); Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2203.
40. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2203.
41. 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (h)(3); Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2203.
42. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2203–04.
43. Id. at 2204.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2203.
46. Id. at 2204.
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petition can move from one preference category to another without 
the need for a new sponsor.47 In agreeing with this interpretation, the 
Scialabba Court first pointed out that this understanding of 
“automatic conversion” is consistent with the way the phrase was 
used in other immigration laws at the time the Congress passed the 
CSPA.48 
The Court then explained the consequence of allowing 
“automatic conversion” to apply in situations that require a new 
sponsor for the derivative beneficiary.49 If “automatic conversion” 
were allowed in such circumstances, the Court reasoned, it would 
undermine the core premise of the family preference system that 
every beneficiary must have a qualified sponsor.50 According to the 
Court, this would undermine the premise because a new qualified 
sponsor will rarely exist at the time a visa petition is to be 
automatically converted.51 
Additionally, the Court explained that even if a new sponsor 
could exist, his or her visa petition on behalf of the aged out 
derivative beneficiary could be declined for several reasons.52 As a 
result, the derivative beneficiary could not automatically convert and 
would be left with no qualifying sponsor.53 The Court’s rationale for 
upholding the BIA’s interpretation therefore rested on consistency 
with other immigration laws and the negative consequence of the 
opposing interpretation. 
47. Id. at 2201.
48. Id. at 2204. The Court points to 8 CFR sections 204.2(i)(1)–(3) as an example of another
immigration law that provided for “automatic conversion” only when the conversion “entailed 
nothing more than picking up the petition from one category and dropping it into another.” Id. 
49. Id. at 2205.
50. Id.
51. Id. The date of conversion is the date a visa becomes available for the principal
beneficiary. Since the principal beneficiary would be the new sponsor for the aged out derivative 
beneficiary, the principal beneficiary would not qualify as a new sponsor on that date because he 
or she must file a new visa petition on behalf of the aged out derivative beneficiary. Id. 
52. Id. Reasons for declining a visa petition include lack of adequate proof of parentage,
committing a disqualifying crime, and failing to undertake required financial obligations. See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1154, 1183 (2012). 
53. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2205.
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V. THE VARYING INTERPRETATIONS OF PROVISION (H)(3)
The BIA’s decision in Matter of Wang is the first judicial 
interpretation of Provision (h)(3).54 In that case, Wang, a non-citizen 
father immigrating on an F4 visa petition (brother or sister of a U.S. 
citizen) filed by his U.S. citizen sister, listed his young daughter as a 
derivative beneficiary.55 Unfortunately, Wang had to endure a 
twelve-year wait time before his visa application became current.56 
Consequently, his daughter aged out during that period and no longer 
qualified as a derivative beneficiary.57 Wang then filed a new 
petition on his daughter’s behalf for an F2B visa (unmarried adult 
sons and daughters of LPRs) and requested the priority date of his 
original F4 visa petition filed by his sister.58 Although the F2B visa 
was approved, an immigration official denied the request for Wang’s 
original priority date.59 As a result, Wang’s daughter was assigned a 
priority date corresponding to the date the F2B visa was approved, 
forcing her to endure another long wait.60 
The case reached the BIA after the immigration official 
requested to have her decision certified.61 The issue the BIA 
considered was whether Provision (h)(3) allowed Wang’s daughter to 
automatically convert from an F4 visa to an F2B visa while still 
retaining the priority date of her father’s F4 visa.62 In examining the 
language of Provision (h)(3), the BIA concluded that the language 
was ambiguous because it did not “expressly state which petitions 
qualify for automatic conversion and retention of priority dates.”63 
To resolve the ambiguity, the BIA looked to legislative intent 
and prior usage of the concept of “automatic conversion” in other 
immigration regulations.64 In doing so, the BIA made two important 
conclusions: (1) aged out derivative beneficiaries could 
54. Dianne Milner, Note, No Child Left Unprotected: Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s
Interpretation of the Child Status Protection Act in de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 46 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 683, 692 (2013).
55. Matter of Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 29 (B.I.A. 2009).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 29–30.
61. Id. at 30.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 33.
64. Id. at 33, 35.
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automatically convert from one family preference visa to another 
only when they did not require a new visa petition, and (2) the 
retention of the principal beneficiary’s priority date only applies to 
visa petitions filed by the same family member.65 Since Wang’s 
daughter required a new visa petition to convert to the F2B visa, and 
Wang (not Wang’s sister) filed this petition, the BIA upheld the 
decision to disallow automatic conversion with priority date retention 
for Wang’s daughter.66 
A second judicial interpretation of Provision (h)(3) occurred in 
Li v. Renaud,67 heard in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. In Li, the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s 
decision to dismiss the appellants’ complaint alleging their 
unmarried adult son was entitled to priority date retention.68 The 
Second Circuit first determined whether deference should have been 
given to the BIA’s interpretation of Provision (h)(3) in Matter of 
Wang.69 In contrast to the Supreme Court in Scialabba, the Second 
Circuit found that Provision (h)(3) unambiguously expressed the 
intent of Congress, and therefore the BIA should not have been given 
deference.70 The Second Circuit reasoned that because the language 
of the provision called for both automatic conversion and priority 
date retention, Congress intended to bestow both benefits on aged 
out derivative beneficiaries.71 However, the Second Circuit qualified 
this interpretation by concluding that automatic conversion only 
applies to visa petitions that can change categories without the need 
to file a new petition.72 Thus, the Second Circuit interpreted 
Provision (h)(3) to allow priority date retention and automatic 
conversion, but only when automatic conversion does not require 
filing a new visa petition on behalf of the derivative beneficiary.73 
Just weeks after the Second Circuit decided Li v. Renaud, the 
Fifth Circuit interpreted Provision (h)(3) in Khalid v. Holder.74 In 
Khalid, the Fifth Circuit reviewed a case in which a Pakistani citizen 
65. Id. at 35–36.
66. Id. at 39.
67. 654 F.3d 376 (2d Cir. 2011); Milner, supra note 54, at 693.
68. Li, 654 F.3d at 377.
69. Id. at 382.
70. Id. at 382–83.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 384.
73. See id. at 382–84.
74. 655 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2011).
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had aged out and no longer qualified as a derivative beneficiary 
under his mother’s F4 (brother or sister of U.S. citizen) visa 
application.75 Similar to the Second Circuit, the Fifth Circuit 
concluded that the language of Provision (h)(3) was not ambiguous.76 
However, the Fifth Circuit’s rationale was different; it found that the 
language of the other two provisions in section 3 clarified any 
ambiguities in Provision (h)(3).77 Specifically, because Provision 
(h)(2) provides that derivative beneficiaries under all family 
preference categories can benefit from the age formula in Provision 
(h)(1), and because Provision (h)(3) references Provision (h)(1), 
priority date retention applies automatic conversions to any of the 
family preference categories.78 The Fifth Circuit therefore disagreed 
with the Second Circuit because it did not interpret Provision (h)(3) 
as restricting priority date retention. 
The final judicial interpretation of Provision (h)(3) prior to 
Scialabba was the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation in de Osorio v. 
Mayorkas.79 De Osorio was the precursor to Scialabba and involved 
three similarly situated families arguing for priority date retention to 
apply to an aged out derivative beneficiary.80 The Ninth Circuit 
followed the Fifth Circuit’s analysis and found that Provision (h)(3) 
was unambiguous because of the provision’s references to Provisions 
(h)(1) and (h)(2).81 The Ninth Circuit believed the interrelatedness 
of the three provisions expressed Congress’s “intent to 
extend automatic conversion and priority date retention to all 
family-sponsored derivative beneficiaries.”82 Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that if the intent of Provision (h)(3) was to limit 
automatic conversion to situations where a new visa petition was not 
required, Congress would have used that language.83 
75. Id. at 365–66.
76. Id. at 370–71.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 695 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct.
2191 (2014). 
80. Id. at 1010.
81. Id. at 1012.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1015–16. The court notes that Congress used such specific language under 8
C.F.R. section 204.2(a)(4), which predated the CSPA. Since this language was not implemented
into Provision (h)(3), Congress did not intend for automatic conversion to apply only when a new
visa petition is not required. Id.
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VI. ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HAVE FOLLOWED THE
APPROACH OF THE FIFTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS
The Supreme Court in Scialabba erred in its approach to
interpreting Provision (h)(3). First, the Court wrongly determined 
that the provision was ambiguous and should not have deferred to the 
BIA’s interpretation of the provision. In applying principles of 
administrative statutory interpretation governed by Chevron U.S.A v. 
National Resources Defense Council,84 the Supreme Court 
mistakenly concluded that Congress did not speak directly to the 
question at issue.85 Moreover, the Court failed to read Provision 
(h)(3) in the context of the overall statutory scheme. Second, the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ approach to interpreting Provision (h)(3) 
and their actual interpretation of the provision are correct. The Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits’ approach is correct because it considered the 
overall statutory scheme of section 3 of the CSPA. In turn, their 
interpretation of Provision (h)(3) is correct because it avoids the 
negative implications of the BIA’s interpretation and is good public 
policy. Third, the Court’s concerns regarding automatic conversion 
and priority date retention are misguided and easily rectified. 
A. The Supreme Court Erred in Interpreting Provision (h)(3)
The Supreme Court in Scialabba should not have deferred to the
BIA’s interpretation of Provision (h)(3) because the provision is 
unambiguous. Statutes written by the BIA are subject to the 
principles of interpretation outlined in Chevron.86 First, a court must 
decide whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question 
at issue.”87 In doing so, a court should consider the language of the 
statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme.88 Additionally, 
a court should attempt to fit all parts of a statute into one coherent 
whole.89 After these considerations, if the intent of Congress is clear, 
the analysis is over, and the statute’s unambiguous language will 
84. 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Interpretation of “an administrative agency’s construction of a
statute that it administers” is governed by Chevron. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 
529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000). 
85. See Scialabba v. Cueller de Osario, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2213 (2014).
86. Id. at 2203.
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
88. Brown, 529 U.S. at 132–33.
89. Id. at 133 (quoting Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389
(1959)). 
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govern the question at issue.90 However, if Congress has failed to 
directly address the question at issue, a court must defer to the 
administrative agency that authored the statute unless that 
interpretation is impermissible.91 
The Supreme Court in Scialabba erred in concluding that 
Provision (h)(3) is ambiguous because it did not properly decide 
whether Congress spoke directly to the question at issue. The 
question at issue here was whether Provision (h)(3) provides for 
automatic conversion and priority date retention for derivative 
beneficiaries of all family preference categories. In determining 
whether Congress spoke to this question, the Supreme Court should 
have considered Provision (h)(3) in the statutory context of all of 
section 3 of the CSPA. Instead, the Court read only Provision (h)(3) 
and concluded that it answered the question at issue “in divergent 
ways.”92 The only time the Court looked outside of Provision (h)(3) 
was when it attempted to explain the meaning of “conversion” by 
comparing Provision (h)(3) to previous laws or other CSPA 
sections.93 However, “conversion” is only one aspect of Provision 
(h)(3) and does not encompass the meaning of the provision. 
Therefore, the Court’s effort to interpret Provision (h)(3) could 
hardly be considered as attempting to fit all pieces of the statute into 
one coherent whole. 
B. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits Were Correct in Their Approach
and Interpretation of Provision (h)(3)
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ approach to interpreting Provision
(h)(3) was correct because it considered the underlying statutory 
framework of section 3 of the CSPA. In following the principles 
prescribed by Chevron,94 both courts found that Provision (h)(3) was 
unambiguous because of the way Provision (h)(3) fit with the other 
sections of Provision (h).95 The two courts noted that although 
Provision (h)(3) does not specifically state which family preference 
categories qualify for automatic conversion and priority date 
90. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.
91. Id. at 843.
92. Scialabba v. Cueller de Osario, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014).
93. Id. at 2203–05.
94. de Osorio v. Mayorkas, 695 F.3d 1003, 1011 (9th Cir. 2012); Khalid v. Holder, 655 F.3d
363, 366–67 (5th Cir. 2011). 
95. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012; Khalid, 655 F.3d at 370.
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retention, Provision (h)(3) does reference Provision (h)(1).96 Since 
Provision (h)(1) expressly references Provision (h)(2), which states 
that the formula in Provision (h)(1) applies to all family preference 
categories, Provision (h)(3) must be read to apply to all family 
preference categories.97 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits agreed that 
reading Provision (h) as a whole confirms that Provision (h)(3) was 
intended to apply to all family preference categories.98 
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ actual interpretation of Provision 
(h)(3) is correct because it avoids the negative implications of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation and is good public policy. One 
negative implication of the BIA’s interpretation is that it limits 
Provision (h)(3)’s application to only one scenario: where the 
original sponsor is one parent of the derivative beneficiary, and the 
principal beneficiary is the other parent.99 This scenario is 
uncommon because the would-be derivative beneficiary already 
qualifies for an F2B visa (unmarried son/daughter of an LPR) and 
therefore does not have to be a derivative beneficiary. Moreover 
Provision (h)(3) would have nearly the same effect as the previous 
regulation that spoke on this issue.100 For these reasons, this 
interpretation can hardly be what Congress intended in adopting 
CSPA. 
Another negative implication of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of Provision (h)(3) is that it establishes a dangerous 
precedent in interpreting immigration laws. Provision (h)(3) was 
determined to be ambiguous because it addressed the issue of 
automatic conversion and priority date retention in “divergent 
ways.”101 Similar to Provision (h) of the CSPA, many provisions in 
immigration laws are complex and include cross-references to other 
provisions.102 If the Supreme Court’s standard of ambiguity is that a 
provision could be read in “divergent ways,” there could be countless 
provisions that would be considered ambiguous. 
96. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012; Khalid, 655 F.3d at 370.
97. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012; Khalid, 655 F.3d at 370–71.
98. de Osorio, 695 F.3d at 1012; Khalid, 655 F.3d at 371.
99. Khalid, 655 F.3d at 374. The derivative beneficiary could therefore automatically
convert to an F2B visa (unmarried adult son or daughter of LPR) without a new visa petition and 
keep the principal beneficiary’s priority date. Id. 
100. See id. at 374 (referencing 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(4) (2012)).
101. Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191, 2203 (2014).
102. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)(B) (2012) (noting exceptions to an employment-based
category of immigration visas with several cross-references to other provisions). 
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Lastly, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of Provision 
(h)(3) is good public policy because it comports with the overall 
intent of the CSPA. When it was introduced in the Senate, the 
CSPA’s goal was to address the aging out issue.103 Senator Feinstein, 
who introduced the CPSA, spoke of the aging out problem being 
caused by agency delay and visa demand.104 The Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits’ interpretation of Provision (h)(3) addresses both of these 
causes in providing for automatic conversion and priority date 
retention. In recognizing the consequences of agency delay, 
Provision (h)(3) allows for automatic conversion even if the 
derivative beneficiary cannot avoid aging out through the formula in 
Provision (h)(1). Similarly, Provision (h)(3) realizes the high demand 
for family preference visas by allowing derivative beneficiaries to 
retain their parent’s priority date so they avoid the long wait times 
caused by high demand. In short, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ 
interpretation of Provision (h)(3) addresses the concerns that 
Congress contemplated in adopting the CSPA. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Concerns Are Misguided
and Easily Rectified 
The Scialabba Court had three principal concerns about 
interpreting Provision (h)(3) to allow priority date retention and 
automatic conversion for all family preference visas. One concern is 
that allowing automatic conversion to all family preference visas 
would undermine the requirement that each non-citizen must have a 
qualified sponsor.105 The second concern is that a qualified sponsor 
would rarely exist at the time of automatic conversion.106 The third 
concern is that allowing automatic conversion and priority date 
retention is not the automatic process intended by Provision (h)(3).107 
1. Undermining the Qualified Sponsor Requirement
Allowing automatic conversion to all family preference visas 
would not undermine the qualified sponsor requirement because this 
requirement would still be in effect. If automatic conversion to all 
103. See Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2199; 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
104. Khalid, 655 F.3d at 371; 147 CONG. REC. 5239 (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
105. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2205.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2209.
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family categories were allowed, the principal beneficiary (the 
derivative beneficiary’s parent) would step in as the new sponsor for 
the derivative beneficiary.108 Once the principal beneficiary officially 
becomes an LPR, they can petition for the derivative beneficiary (the 
unmarried adult son or daughter) to enter the United States under an 
F2B visa.109 The Supreme Court’s concern is that this new sponsor 
might not qualify as a sponsor for a number of reasons: failing to 
pass border inspection, deciding not to immigrate, or not meeting the 
requirements to petition for the derivative beneficiary.110 
However, this concern is easily addressed if USCIS requires 
derivative beneficiaries to simply wait until the new sponsor is 
qualified. To become qualified, the new sponsor merely has to 
confirm their LPR status by passing border inspection,111 and file a 
visa petition on behalf of the derivative beneficiary. Unlike waiting 
for a visa to become available, the process of filing and accepting a 
visa petition takes months instead of years.112 Should the sponsor not 
qualify, the derivative beneficiary would have to find another way to 
immigrate. The concern about undermining the qualified sponsor 
requirement is easily rectified by having the derivative beneficiary 
wait a short period for the new sponsor to qualify. 
2. No Qualified Sponsor at Time of Automatic Conversion
The Supreme Court’s concern that a qualified sponsor will not
exist at the time of automatic conversion is misguided because there 
is no such legal requirement. According to the Court, the time of 
automatic conversion is “the date on which a derivative beneficiary 
is deemed to have either aged out or not.”113 The date on which a 
derivative beneficiary’s age is determined is the date that a visa 
becomes available for the principal beneficiary (the derivative 
beneficiary’s parent).114 In the Court’s eyes, this is a problem 
because the potential new sponsor (the principal beneficiary) could 
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2199.
112. See id.; see also USCIS Processing Time Information, US CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR.
SERVS., https://egov.uscis.gov/cris/processTimesDisplayInit.do (last visited Feb. 19, 2015) 
(providing estimated processing times at USCIS offices). 
113. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2205.
114. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1153(h)(1)(A)–(B) (2012); Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2205.
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not possibly be a qualified sponsor before he or she is even able to 
file his or her visa application.115 
Despite the Court’s insistence on having a qualified sponsor at 
the time of automatic conversion, there is no provision that mandates 
this. The family preference system requires a sponsor to obtain a 
family preference visa,116 but nothing in the CSPA requires that a 
sponsor exist at the moment of automatic conversion.117 Moreover, 
there is no practical effect to having a qualified sponsor at the time of 
automatic conversion. As long as a qualified sponsor exists at the 
time a visa petition is filed for a derivative beneficiary, he or she can 
qualify for automatic conversion. The Supreme Court’s concern over 
having a qualified sponsor at the time of automatic conversion is 
misguided because it is a requirement that simply does not exist in 
immigration law. 
3. Automatic Conversion and Priority Date Retention
Are Not Automatic Processes 
The Supreme Court’s final principal concern is that allowing 
automatic conversion and priority date retention would create a 
burdensome process that is not automatic. The Court’s contention is 
that having a new sponsor file a visa petition on behalf of the 
derivative beneficiary creates logistical problems. According to the 
Court, if the USCIS were to allow derivative beneficiaries to wait for 
a new qualified sponsor, this would require “administrative juggling 
to hold off the derivative beneficiary’s visa adjudication.”118 Such 
maneuvering would include deferring the derivative beneficiary’s 
consular interview and disregarding the original visa petition filed by 
the principal beneficiary’s sponsor.119 The Court concluded that such 
a process does not conform to the idea of “automatic conversion” 
because it requires “special intervention, purposeful delay, and 
deviation from standard administrative practice.”120 
115. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2206. Before the principal beneficiary could be a qualified
sponsor, he or she would have to file his or her visa application, have it be accepted, pass border 
inspection, and be granted LPR status, then file a new petition for the derivative beneficiary. Id. at 
2199. 
116. See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a)(1)(A).
117. See Child Status Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 107-208, 116 Stat. 927 (2002) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
118. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2209.
119. See id.
120. Id.
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Delaying consular interviews and other procedural steps is not 
so burdensome as to negate the idea of “automatic conversion.” 
Despite the fact that “automatic conversion” has been interpreted in 
other immigration laws to preclude delays or deviations,121 the 
changes required here are minute. Delays in examining a derivative 
beneficiary’s visa application would total a handful of months,122 and 
could easily be shortened by having the principal beneficiary prepare 
the derivative’s visa petition while filing his or her own visa 
application. Moreover, a minor change to the visa petition form 
could be made to allow the new sponsor (principal beneficiary) to 
note that the derivative beneficiary qualifies under the CSPA for 
automatic conversion and priority date retention. Thus, when USCIS 
receives this petition, officials would know which category to slot 
the derivative beneficiary and could easily move on to the process of 
consular interviews and examination of the visa application. At most, 
the USCIS would be dealing with minor changes to the petition form 
and a delay of several months. 
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Scialabba erred in interpreting Provision 
(h)(3). The Court failed to consider Provision (h)(3) in the overall 
statutory context of Provision (h) and therefore mistakenly concluded 
that Provision (h)(3) was ambiguous. In doing so, the Court wrongly 
deferred to the BIA’s interpretation of the provision. Instead, the 
Supreme Court should have followed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits’ 
approach to interpreting Provision (h)(3). This approach correctly fit 
Provision (h)(3) within the other provisions of Provision (h) to create 
a harmonious whole. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court should have adopted the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation of Provision (h)(3). This 
interpretation is correct because it avoids the negative implications of 
the BIA’s interpretation of the provision, and is good public policy 
because it comports with the overall goal of the CSPA. For these 
reasons, the Supreme Court should have followed the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits in their approach to interpreting, and in their actual 
interpretation, of Provision (h)(3). 
121. See Milner, supra note 54, at 703.
122. Scialabba, 134 S. Ct. at 2199.
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